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COUNSELING COUNSEL FOR CIDLDREN
Martin Guggenheim*
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS. By Jean Koh Peters.
Miamisburg, Ohio: LEXIS. 1997. Pp. 917. $85.
INTRODUCTION
You are a lawyer working in juvenile court, representing chil
dren in proceedings in which their parents are accused of being un
fit. Your clients range in age from newborns to seventeen-year
olds. At any one time you have 125 active cases on your docket.
You work hard at your job, and you believe deeply in the rights of
the children you represent. Occasionally, it occurs to you that you
don't really have as good a sense as perhaps you should of your
precise role and how you ought to discharge your responsibilities to
your clients. But you don't ever seem to have the time to work
through such theoretical issues. You are too practical to consider
more than the need to get through your daily docket.
Even though lawyers (and other representatives such as guardi
ans ad !item) have been representing children in child protective
proceedings for more than twenty-five years and are currently serv
ing that function in every jurisdiction in the United States,1 there is
no uniform definition of a lawyer's role and responsibilities in this
context. As a result, lawyers have been remarkably free - or re
markably burdened - to figure this out for themselves. Even
worse, "in almost any state . . . one will encounter within the state a
deep disagreement about [one's] role" (p. 33).
Few topics are in greater need of a book clarifying the law than
the role of counsel in child protective proceedings. Lawyers repre
senting children in child protective proceedings are entitled to clear
answers about their role and the tasks they should undertake in the
discharge of their duties. One of the virtues of Jean Koh Peters's
* Professor of Clinical Law; Director, Clinical and Advocacy Programs, New York
University School of Law. B.A. 1968, Buffalo; J.D. 1971, New York University. - Ed. I
gratefully acknowledge the support from the Ftlomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg
Research Fund at New York University School of Law and the fine research assistance of
Eric Dorsch, N.Y.U. Class of 1998.
1. In 1974, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5105-5107 {1994), which created the first nationwide incentive for appointing rep
resentatives for children in all child protective proceedings. The statutes of every jurisdiction
in the United States requiring the appointment of a representative for children in child pro
tective proceedings are set forth in REPRESENTING CHILDREN, pp. 253-479.
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book is to free lawyers from doubts about their role and to liberate
them to discharge their responsibilities appropriately.
Peters is an extraordinarily knowledgeable and thoughtful child
advocate with substantial experience in representing children in a
broad range of legal proceedings. She is also a gifted and reflective
teacher of advocacy. As a scholar of children's rights who has
trained students at Columbia and Yale in representing children
under her supervision, Peters is perhaps better equipped to answer
the profoundly difficult questions of role and responsibility than
any other writer in the field. No one before her has come close to
writing a book for the child advocacy audience that is as sophisti
cated or wise as this one.

Representing Children does many things. It establishes and de
fines the role of counsel for children in child protective proceed
ings. It tells lawyers what steps they should take in the course of
their representation and why they should take them. It explains
when lawyers ought to empower their clients and treat them as
principals (as is the norm for lawyers and clients in other contexts).
It also tells lawyers how they should determine what outcome to
seek when a client is unable to express a preference for a particular
outcome, or when a client's disability or immaturity makes it impos
sible or inappropriate to follow the client's instruction.
This book is, in my opinion, the definitive text of what lawyers
should do in the role of a court-appointed lawyer for a child in a
child protection proceeding. For this reason, it is required reading
for all lawyers who represent children. But many others related to
the field of child advocacy - including social workers, lawyers for
child care agencies, prosecutors, and judges - would also profit
enormously by reading it. Moreover, lawyers in other fields would
be well-advised to read it for the nuggets of advice about what con
stitutes effective advocacy and what steps a lawyer ought to take to
secure a result for a client whenever the outcome is likely to be
obtained, as is the case in child advocacy-related proceedings,
through means other than a contested courtroom trial.

Representing Children is fundamentally a book about strategic
lawyering. Peters offers truly outstanding practical suggestions
about how to represent a child effectively in a world in which the
crucial decisions about the lives of children are made at meetings,
not in the courtroom. Identifying interdisciplinary meetings as rep
resenting our current best ideas about coordinating client needs,
Peters hopes "that lawyers will eventually consider meeting practice
more important than trial practice in the work of representing their
clients" (p. 190). The chapter on the interdisciplinary meeting
should be read by all advocates in all kinds of cases. It will, I pre-

1490

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1488

diet, become a valued treasure for clinicians teaching informal
advocacy.2
As far as addressing the challenges of representation, a small
criticism is that Peters pays little attention to practical problems
such as caseload management. In many offices, such as the Office
of the Public Defender in Chicago, lawyers routinely have active
caseloads exceeding 300, sometimes reaching 600 cases.3 Surely
lawyers with these choking caseloads will be unable to do most of
what Peters advises they do. But this criticism is perhaps unfair. In
Representing Children, Peters establishes a standard of practice by
offering a complete vision of the tasks lawyers perform for children.
There will be plenty of time, in the wake of her groundbreaking
work, to address strategies for making it possible to undertake the
appropriate tasks given the overwhelming reality. All advocates for
children should be indebted to Peters for establishing the gold stan
dard, even if few of us are ever actually able to achieve it.
In this review, I plan to address only some of the many out
standing ideas Peters sets forth in the book. Part I explores the
core concepts involved in representing children and discusses Pe
ters's views of when and why to empower children to control the
advocacy of their representatives. Because lawyers for children are
invariably compelled to decide what kind of lawyer they are to be
- for instance, whether they will take their instructions about what
outcomes to seek from their clients, whether they will decide for
themselves what outcomes to try to achieve, or whether they will do
neither - Peters devotes an appropriately substantial amount of
time to the role of counsel for children. Part II analyzes the impli
cations of Peters's advocacy proposals from a practical perspective
and examines the likely impact of these proposals on her target au
dience. Finally, Part III addresses problems with Peters's views on
the role of counsel from a theoretical perspective.
As will soon be apparent, I agree with Peters's views of what
lawyers for children should do when representing their clients in
·

2. Peters sees informal advocacy as crucial to successful lawyering in this field, and she
offers sophisticated advice about how to become involved in meetings. Peters cautions
against lawyers dominating discussions and makes two crucial points about listening. See p.
174. First, in her experience when lawyers and nonlawyer professionals meet, "[i]t is often
disarming and a relief to other attendees when a lawyer spends the first part of a meeting
listening to and absorbing both the substantive and procedural aspects of the meeting." P.
180. Disarming others in the same case makes good strategic sense. What makes even
greater sense is paying sufficient attention to the expressed needs and interests of others so
that the advocate is poised to make proposals that the others are likely to accept. Peters
wants lawyers to learn about the other professionals in the case and to try to determine what
is driving them and what they are most concerned with. Once this is known, the lawyer is
ready to go into action and make proposals that factor in the needs and interests of these
professionals and of the client.
3. See Interview with Patrick Murphy, Public Guardian of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois
(Apr. 11, 1997).

May 1999]

Representing Children

1491

child protective proceedings. Indeed, in my opinion, this book of
fers better advice on this subject than any other book ever written.
But the theories that underlie Peters's practical advice are another
matter. In the course of this review, and particularly in Part III, I
will identify several problematic aspects of Peters's theories, all the
while agreeing with the endpoint to which these ideas lead her. In
particular, Peters's methodology leads her to recommend what law
yers representing children ought to do by first undertaking the task
of deciding what is best for children who are enmeshed in the foster
care system. Then she directs that lawyers representing children
pursue actions consistent with Peters's views about child develop
ment. Though this methodology apparently has much to offer, I
hope to demonstrate the hidden dangers lurking behind it.

I.

JusT WHAT ARE CmLDREN's LAWYERS ANYwAY?
MOUTHPIECES FOR THEIR CLIENTS OR INDEPENDENT
GUARDIANS ASSIGNED TO PROTECT THEIR
CLIENTS' BEST INTERESTS?

Lawyers who represent children are in desperate need of gui
dance to help them articulate and understand their role. The most
basic questions need answering. When are lawyers supposed to
treat their child clients as the principals in the attorney-client rela
tionship? When are lawyers free to disregard their clients' ex
pressed instructions as to the objectives sought in the case? And
when lawyers are free to decide for themselves what objectives to
seek, how should they go about deciding what to do? Peters has
answers to all of these questions, and more.
Peters is sensitive to the problem of an undefined role for a
child's representative, which would permit the lawyer to do what
the lawyer wants.4 Peters believes, as I do, that it is crucial to estab
lish parameters for lawyers assigned to represent children that max
imize the probability that different lawyers will do approximately
identical things in the course of representing like children in like
cases and that, at the least, lawyers will be advocating for like re
sults in like cases.
Peters is particularly insistent to avoid proposing a set of rules
that frees lawyers to do whatever they want. As Peters has
explained:

This extreme form of best interests representation omits several of
the most fundamental characteristics of lawyering. The lawyer-client
partnership and dialogue is reduced to a one-person monologue
wholly unchecked by the client. The client becomes an object, rather
4. Throughout this review, I shall use the term "lawyer" or "counsel" to include any rep
resentative for a child, including a guardian ad !item who may not be a member of the Bar.

·
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than the subject, of the representation. The lawyer, usually agent,
acts as the principal in the relationship.5

For this reason, her avowed goal is to constrain the degree of dis
cretion lawyers for young children have to decide for themselves
which positions to advocate on behalf of their clients.
A. Empowering Children to Set the Objectives in Their Cases
Perhaps the easiest way to ensure uniformity is to require that
lawyers presume their clients have a sufficient degree of knowledge
and maturity to set the objectives in the case. After all, what makes
representing children so different from representing adults is "that
the child's lawyer . . . is 'adrift without the anchor of a principal.' "6
By defining the child as the principal, most of the difficult ethical
issues are eliminated.
For Peters, as for many other writers in the field,7 the wisest way
to accomplish this is to advocate for the child's preferences.8 Thus,
Peters instructs that lawyers for children operate under two "de
faults" that are relevant to this issue. The first is a "competency
default," and the second is an "advocacy default.'' Under the for
mer, a lawyer should regard his or her client as unable
to act in her best interests only where evidence independent of the
representation demonstrates clear and specific limitations on the
child's ability to understand information and make judgments. . . .
[T]he decision that the child cannot adequately act in her own inter
ests cannot be made until the child's maximum competence is fully
explored by the lawyer. [p. 130; footnote omitted]
5. Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content ofBest Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1505, 1526 (1996).
6. P. 34 (quoting Peters's conversation with Geoffrey Hazard on June 5, 1992).
7. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowennent: Rethinking the Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1655 (1996);
see also Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of their
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699 (1996); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S.
England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am I?", 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1917
(1996).
8. Although Peters does not discuss this point, it is important to recognize that there is a
prominent counterpoint to empowering children. Some scholars have recognized the difficul
ties posed by making the child's preference in a custody-related case a focus of attention.
See, e.g., Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of
Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 81 YALE L J 1126,
1165 (1978).
Psychology and moral theory both warn the attorney not to force participation on the
child. If a client is entitled to participate and to be informed, he is also entitled to do neither.
Studies of children of divorce indicate that there may be very good reasons for a child's
decision not to become directly involved in the dispute over his custody, particularly where
the parents have already framed any choice the child makes in terms of loyalty or treason. In
certain situations and at certain stages of development, the child may wish to resolve a loy
alty conflict by choosing, and that choice may serve important inner needs, but in other situa
tions and stages the child may risk emotional turmoil and parental retribution by taking sides.
.

.
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Under the "advocacy default," lawyers are generally expected to
represent "the child's counseled wish, regardless of the lawyer's per
sonal feeling about whether or not those wishes are prudent . " (p.
72). According to Peters, all children who can be counseled ought
to be empowered to set the objectives for the case (p. 72). More
over, there is no minimum age for making this category.9
For Peters, whenever a child can express an opinion and can be
"effectively counseled," the child is to control the lawyer's advo
cacy. As Peters said in an earlier law review article:
.

.

The only time the child's lawyer may advocate for a position other
than that stated by the client, is after the lawyer, based upon in
dependent evidence arising outside of the representation, has deter
mined that the client's development or circumstances preclude the
client from either expressing a position or being effectively counseled
as to the viability of the position.10
.

Peters, of course, does not envision that lawyers will automati
cally yield to the child's initially articulated position. Instead, she
expects lawyers to exercise skills as a counselor to advise the child
of all of the options and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
At the same time, however, she exhorts lawyers to avoid any at
tempt to overly influence children in reaching the positions they
want. She warns lawyers to resist their understandable temptation
"to impose her own belief upon the client."11 In her words,
although
[i]t may be easier . . . for a lawyer to seek to manipulate her client into
accepting the lawyer's position instead of disciplining herself to advo
cate zealously for the client's position . . . [b]ecause children are even
more likely than adults to be cowed by a lawyer's strong recommen
dation, the lawyer must approach a child client's choice with particu
lar restraint.12

B. When Children Cannot Set the Objectives
Peters recognizes that there are circumstances when lawyers will
not be able or, if able, not be required to advocate an outcome
based on their clients' wishes. These are the many cases in which
9. Peters, describing the concept of a minimum age, says:
Sometimes a child will not have a clear position. This could be a non-verbal child or a
child who could contribute a real but relatively small amount to their representation.
Many people consider children under the age of four to be in this category. Children
with particular disabilities may also fall into this category.
P. 130.
10. Peters, supra note 5, at 1565.
11. See id. at 1521.
12. Id. {footnote omitted); see also Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The
Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1435,
1458 (1996) {"The child's lawyer has an ethical duty to avoid using her superior skills and
social position to silence the child's voice, or coerce the child into passive compliance with
the lawyer's views.").
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children are too young to speak or, though old enough to express a
preference, not old enough for an adult to want to give substantial
weight to their expressed desires. She even recognizes that a very
large number of cases fall into this category. Nonetheless, most of
the book is written as if the lawyer will be representing a client old
enough to set the objectives for the case in a manner that binds the
lawyer to seek that result. For the most part, the book advises law
yers in the particulars of how to achieve the goals they seek and
does somewhat less than expected in telling lawyers how to deter
mine what goals they should seek.
Peters has previously written very thoughtfully on the subject of
precisely what lawyers should do when representing children too
young to set the case's objectives. Instead of elaborating in the
main volume of the book on this subject, however, Peters refers the
reader to other articles - especially her own important Fordham
Law Review article entitled The Roles and Content of Best Interests

in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Pro
ceedings,13 which appears in the book's appendices.14
The Fordham Law Review piece is largely devoted to the subject
of representing very young children in child protective proceedings.
In Peters's words, when lawyers are representing "clients who can
not be counseled," they "are called upon to do the biggest job of all:
to determine the objectives of the client representation."15 Peters
appreciates both the uniqueness and extraordinary difficulty of em
powering lawyers to set the agendas for their clients: " [C]alling
upon a lawyer to determine the goal of her own representation of a
client, largely independent of that client's direct input and largely
independent of the client's wishes, is an anomalous and deeply

13. Peters, supra note 5. In December 1995, Fordham University Law School hosted a
national conference on representing children that resulted in the publication of a special issue
of the Fordham Law Review. See Special Issue, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1996). The conference was sponsored by thirteen orga
nizations that constitute virtually the entire organized bar representing children. See Bruce
A. Green & Bernardine Dohm, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1283 & n.7 (1996).
14. Peters's product is an unconventional compromise in that the book is comprised of
some 225 pages of text and an additional 670 pages of appendices. The core text contains
only seven chapters. The appendices include a historical study of the development of child
protective schemes and a listing and summary of statutes from all jurisdictions in the United
States. Other appendices form an amalgam of materials, including some of Peters's prior
writings and a synopsis of what other writers of child advocacy have said. A reader will not
gain the full understanding of the role and tasks of lawyers representing very young children
without a careful reading of Peters's Fordham Law Review article. I question, however,
whether many readers will bother to read the appendices. I think both Peters and the pub
lisher erred by dividing the book in this way, thus expecting somewhat more of the typical
reader than is reasonable.
15. Peters, supra note 5, at 1519.
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complicated divergence from the usual p ath of legal
representation. "16
Roughly speaking, there are two categories of cases in which
special advice needs to be given to lawyers when representing
young children. First, lawyers are unable to advocate for the cli
ent's expressed preference when clients are too young to express
any wish. Second, lawyers are not required to do their. client's bid
ding even when the client is old enough to speak if the client is not
sufficiently mature for his or her wishes to be given controlling
weight. The first category is mostly objective, involving newborns,
infants, and young toddlers. Though its uppermost boundaries are
indefinite, it is relatively easy to agree about which children are too
young to express themselves. The second category is quite differ
ent. Here we are talking about verbal children, and, consequently,
there will be less agreement among lawyers representing children
about which children are mature enough to deserve to have their
views control a lawyer's advocacy.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know precisely when a client's
views ought not to be binding on the lawyer. Peters does little to
tell lawyers how to demarcate between verbal children whom law
yers must heed and those whom they may not. But it is clear she
prefers that lawyers err by deeming children mature enough to set
the objectives. Although Peters fails to provide a definitive state
ment, she instructs lawyers not to be bound by the stated wishes of
their counseled clients only when the lawyer concludes that the cli
ent "cannot adequately act in her own interests" (p. 130). But, it
should be emphasized, Peters believes children at four years of age
can often act in their own interests and, thus, should be permitted
to set the objectives of the case (p. 72). Thus, under Peters's rule, it
would seem that lawyers are obliged to allow their child clients to
set the case's objectives in the vast majority of cases.
This is a field, however, where the exception may actually be
greater than the rule. This is so for two reasons. First, many chil
dren in child protective proceedings are very young. Although it is
difficult to obtain national data on the age of children who are the
subjects of child protective proceedings, it appears that most chil
dren are under eight years of age when the petition is first filed, and
a high percentage are under three.17 Second, apart from the fact
that many children in these proceedings are very young, in many
jurisdictions the lawyer's role when representing children in child
protective proceedings seems to require that the lawyer advocate
the child's best interests, rather than the child's preferences, even
16. Id. at 1522.
17. See Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counselfor Children in Custody,
Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 299, 327 & n.129 {1998).
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when the children are not young. By Peters's count, thirty-one ju
risdictions require lawyers in child protective proceedings to repre
sent the child's best interests (app. B). If lawyers in those
jurisdictions are required to advocate on the basis of the child's best
interests, then the majority of children in the United States will not
be empowered to set the objectives of their child protective case
even when they are as old as fourteen or fifteen.ls
For these reasons, it is crucial to explain the role of counsel for
children when the attorney is not expected to advocate the client's
preferred outcome. In her Fordham article, Peters identifies, criti
ques, and ultimately rejects the four commonly used models law
yers for children use when forced to choose what outcome to
advocate: (1) The Total Lawyer Discretion Model; (2) The Expert
Deference Model; (3) The Psychological Parent Model; and (4) The
Family Network Model.19 The Total Lawyer Discretion Model is,
as its name makes clear, the most open-ended of the four. The Ex
pert Deference Model "defers the best interests decision to one of
three kinds of experts in the case: one already involved with the
child or family, one appointed by the court, or one retained by the
attomey. "20
Peters rather quickly (and, in my view, appropriately) rejects
the Total Lawyer Discretion Model as giving lawyers unbridled
power they are untrained to exercise, because she is unwilling to
empower randomly assigned members of the bar who are too likely
to rely on their own values and biases when deciding what to advo
cate. 21 She rejects the Expert Deference Model for the opposite
reason - it prevents independent judgment by the lawyer. None
theless, Peters supports a close working relationship with experts,
such as social workers who may be on the staff in the office of the
child's lawyer. She acknowledges, however, that this is an ex
tremely expensive option that most lawyers are unable to use.22
18. "If a lawyer's obligation is to represent the child's best interests, it appears that the
child's counseled wish alone cannot be the sole input into the decision-making process." P.
130.
19. See Peters, supra note 5,
20. Id.

21.
I

at 1525-53.

at 1524.

believe that this level of discretion makes it inevitable that the lawyer will some·
times resort to personal value choices, including references to his own childhood, stere·
atypical views of clients whose backgrounds differ from his, and his own lay
understanding of child development and children's needs, in assessing a client's best in
terests. Especially for practitioners who must take cases in high volume, the temptation
to rely on gut instinct, stereotype, or even bias is overwhelming. This jeopardizes the
child client even more, as her unique circumstances are quickly distorted by a stranger
through his own lens of experience and preconception.
Id. at 1526.
22. See id. at 1534.
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Having rejected giving lawyers total discretion, and recognizing
that few lawyers can afford the luxury of working with a team of
experts who will assist them in determining the appropriate out
come to pursue, Peters devotes most of her analysis to Models
Three and Four. The Psychological Parent Model, in Peters's
words, "relies upon principles enunciated by an eminent trio of
scholars who have focused upon continuity of care, the perspective
of the child, and the psychological parent as crucial principles guid
ing all determinations of 'best interests.' "23 The Family Network
Model "proposes instead a child welfare analysis focusing on pre
serving the child's family network."24
The developers of the Psychological Parent Model - Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit - posit a child's need
to develop an "unbroken continuity of affectionate and stimulating
relationships" with an adult.25 Accordingly, these writers argue
that courts deciding child placements should award sole and exclu
sive custody to the psychological parent: the adult who "on a con
tinuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a
parent, as well as the child's physical needs."26 Further, to
strengthen and protect the psychological child-parent relationship,
courts must divest themselves and others of all power over the child
and the child's rearing.
Adherents of the Psychological Parent Model also suggest that
courts should terminate the parental rights of any adult outside the
psychological child-parent relationship.27 Courts should do this
when termination means banishing a biological parent in favor of
the psychological parent who also happens to be a biological par
ynt, and courts should also do this when termination means ban
ishing a biological parent in favor of a foster parent.28

23. Id. at 1524. She is referring to the work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert
J. Solnit. See id. at 1537-38 & n.63.
24. Id. at 1524. This model has been developed by the work of Peggy Davis, among
others. See infra text accompanying notes 30-33.
25. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST !NrERESTS OF THE Cmr.o 6 {1973)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST !NrERESTS]; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE {1996) [here
inafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST !NrERESTS].

26. GOLDSTEIN ET AL, THE BEST !NrERESTS, supra note 26, at 98. The psychological
parent could be the biological, adoptive, or foster parent, but the interests of the child dictate
that the State must award custody of the child to the parent who has demonstrated the high
est likelihood of developing the psychological child-parent relationship. Generally, this is
defined by ascertaining which adult currently fills this role in the child's life.
27. See id. at 35-36.
28. See infra note 61.
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In contrast, Peggy Cooper D avis, a proponent of the "family
systems" perspective, aggressively challenges the core message of
the Psychological Parent Model.29 In Davis's words:
In contrast to the "out of sight, out of mind" theory that seems to
underlie the recommendations of psychological parent theorists, clini
cians responsive to multiple bonds have worked to develop ways for
children in care to "mourn" or otherwise come to terms in explicit
ways with feelings about their families of origin.30

The Family Network Model challenges the "image of the psycho
logical parent [who invariably] is the mother whose familiar pat
terns of feeding, handling, and comforting the child cannot, without
cost, be interrupted, even by the use of a baby-sitter."31 It comes at
child development from the other end of the spectrum of the psy
chological parent theorists. In Davis's view, the ideal child nurtur
ing role involves encouraging children to experience separation
from important caregivers. She recommends that parents view
"everyday separations . . . as constructive learning experiences
rather than as inflictions of inevitable damage."32 In thorough con
trast with psychological parent theorists, family network theorists
conclude that terminating the parental rights of foster children and
banishing their families from them is a terrible harm inflicted on
children. Rather, they would insist that "adults must transcend dif

ferences of class, race, history, and parenting capacity to provide for
each foster child as cooperative a network of care as the child's de
cidedly disadvantageous circumstances will allow. "33
Peters does not recommend that lawyers representing children
faithfully adhere to either of these models. In her opinion, neither
model does full justice to the complexities of choices facing courts
obliged to decide such weighty matters as termination of parental
rights. She very wisely warns lawyers for children not to "assume
that all determinations of best interests can ultimately be delegated
to others," even experts.34 She adds that lawyers "need to develop
principled ways of determining best interests for themselves in cir
cumstances where these experts are not available to them."35
Peters's important point is that even experts involved in making
recommendations about children start with certain assumptions
about child development theory, whether or not these are stated,
and " [i]n order to work effectively with medical, psychological,
29. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent
Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347 {1996).
30. Id. at 363.
31. Id. at 365.
32. Id. at 368.
33. Id. at 370.
34. Peters, supra note 5, at 1534.
35. Id.
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mental health, and social work professionals, the child's attorney
must understand the various best interests standards applied by
professionals in these fields."36
When removal of the child from home is likely, Peters recom
mends that the child's lawyer "consider the child's current predica
ment not in isolation, but in comparison to the actual alternative
options that foster care provides."37 Peters wants lawyers to appre
ciate the limitations of the state's beneficence. In jurisdictions
where the foster care system lacks good homes in the vicinity, she
warns that children's lawyers who only focus on what is inadequate
about the parent's home may fail to consider that the state's pro
posed alternative may be, in different respects, even more
inadequate.
Peters further advises that the child's lawyer should evaluate all
of the alternatives available by considering the child's "family sys
tem," the family's history, and the child's ordinary, daily life.38 In
some cases, the child's family history will clearly justify reliance on
the Psychological Parent Model, thereby assisting the lawyer in
eliminating some options_ from consideration.39 In other cases, the
Family Network Model will be obviously appropriate, again helping
the lawyer identify the correct options.4o
·

Peters's ultimate contribution is her effort to 'blend' these diver
gent theories, thus creating an "integrated model [that] attempts to
preserve the best of each paradigm while discarding the historically
outdated or the unintentionally harmful."41 Peters subsequently
gives lawyers advice about when to rely on which developmental
theory and for what purposes. Peters especially likes the Psycho
logical Parent Model because it ''requires the lawyer to strive con
stantly to see the past, present, and future options from the child's

36. Id. at 1565.
37. Id. at 1555.
38. See id. at 1566.
39. Peters gives an example:
·
For instance, a child who clearly had one primary caretaker from whom she has exper
ienced a separation, and who is clearly in crisis, may also have no family network to
speak of.Available alternatives which would place the child in a network of care with
no single caregiver would appear to be inappropriate.
Id. at 1555-56.
40.

Peters gives a different illustration for this proposition:

[A] child clearly may be living in the midst of an inner city family network, with a belea
guered potential psychological parent figure in crisis. If the network can support the
child adequately, there may be no need to move the child to a foster home. It may also
aid the child to shore up the psychological parent with supportive services, to afford the
child the security of that special relationship.

Id. at 1556. Peters elaborates on these different theories, explaining what distinguishes them
from each other and how they are similar. I shall return to her analysis of these theories in
somewhat greater detail in Part III.

41.

Id. at

1554.
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point of view and to coax others constantly to do the same. "42 In
cases in which there is a psychological parent who is able to care for
the child, Peters argues that lawyers for children should seriously
consider this person as the child's primary resource.43 In seeking to
'blend' the Psychological Parent theory with Davis's Family Net
work Model, Peters advises lawyers for children to "look beyond
the traditional mother-child dyad to alternative family arrange
ments which provide children with the stability needed for their de
velopment through an integrated family network."44
I am somewhat less confident than Peters in the applied utility
of this analysis, at least insofar as it purports to provide lawyers
with meaningful guidance as to what results to advocate in a given
case. But Peters herself acknowledges that no paradigm will an
swer all questions.4s Partly because of this, she proposes that when
lawyers unavoidably are left to decide things for themselves, they
be deliberately constrained by two additional concepts. First, law
yers should "err on the side of seeking to keep the current family
structure intact, while advocating aggressively for state interven
tions that ameliorate the worrisome conditions in the home."46
Second, the child's lawyer should always compare the result the
lawyer is considering with the child's own desires.47 This latter con
straint does not make a great deal of sense to me when it is applied
to infants and toddlers. Peters seems to believe that lawyers for
42. Id..
43. See id.
44. Id.
[R]esearch indicates that children develop multiple attachments to caregivers who can
help them cope with separation anxiety and stress. The idea of "one psychological par
ent" or "the primary parent" is a concept often emphasized by custody evaluators and
within legal circles. This notion is controversial and has very little empirical support.
There is usually a hierarchy of attachment figures, each of whom may have qualitatively
different types of relationships with the child . . . .
James H. Bray, Psychosocial Factors Affecting Custodial and Visitation Arrangements, 9
BEHAv. SCI. & L. 419, 423 (1991) (citations omitted), quoted in Davis, supra note 29, at 361-

62.
45. See Peters, supra note 5,
46. Id. (footnote omitted).

at

1558.

This default implements a view that Goldstein, Freud, Soinit, and Goldstein, as well as
Davis, and many concerned experts clearly share: the value of minimal state interven
tion, the harm of precipitous removal of children, and the importance of seeking in every
instance the least detrimental alternative. This default also acknowledges the trauma
that the child will experience when she separates precipitously from her family.
Id. at 1558 (footnote omitted).

47.

In Peters's words:

Thus, in the end, the best interests determination must end where it began: with the
attorney trying to see the decision to be made from the child's subjective perspective,
with a focus on the child's uniqueness and individuality. This structure of decision mak
ing, starting and ending with the child, considering the child's circumstances in light of
the two paradigms, and seeking the input of experts when needed, reduces the range of
lawyer discretion to acceptable levels.
Id. at 1558-59.
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extremely young children are capable of discerning the subjective
desires of their clients. I do not. She also apparently believes that
these children's desires are important guideposts for the lawyer's
actions. Again, I do not. Finally, Peters advises that when the law
yer concludes that more than one acceptable option exists, the law
yer's job is to "present evidence and argument describing all these
options to the court while also presenting evidence and argument
opposing all rejected options."48
Peters recognizes that lawyers will have very wide latitude to
make choices for their clients, even if they faithfully adhere to her
ways. As an antidote, Peters also proposes that lawyers always ask
themselves "seven questions to keep us honest" (p. 65). Whenever
a lawyer is about to make a choice in a case, Peters advises the
lawyer to test herself with a series of questions. These questions
are:
1. In making decisions about the representation, am I making the
best effort to assess the case, from my client's subjective point of
view, rather than from an adult's point of view? (p. 65)
2. Does the child understand as much as I can explain about what is
happening in his case? (p. 66)
3. If my client were an adult, would I be taking the same actions,
making the same decisions, and treating her in the same way? (p.

66)
4. If I decide to treat my client differently from the way I would treat
an adult in a similar situation, in what ways will my client con
cretely benefit from that deviation? Is that benefit one which I can
explain to my client? (p. 67)
5. Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for the gratifi
cation of the adults in the case, and not for that of the child? (p. 68)
6. Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for my own
gratification, and not for that of my client? (p. 68)
7. Does the representation, seen as a whole, reflect what is unique
and idiosyncratically characteristic of this child? (p. 69)

These questions will not, of course, tell lawyers what steps they
should take at any given moment. But they are Peters's way of re
minding lawyers that their clients are, after all, at the center of the
case, and that the lawyer's chief task is to keep the client there at all
times.
II.
A.

THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF HER PROPOSAL

When Representing Children Who Set the Objectives

Thus far, this review has briefly looked at the question �f how
lawyers should determine what result to seek when representing
children in child protective proceedings. In this section, I will con48. Id. at 1558.

1502

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1488

sider the likely impact on practice that Peters's book will have if the
bar assiduously follows her advice.
One effect of her work may be to help reduce the unreasonable
caseloads with which many lawyers are now saddled. One possible
explanation for these absurdly high caseload levels is that adminis
trators have not understood what lawyers for children could and
should be doing to discharge their responsibilities. The administra
tors may have believed it was sufficient to provide a child with a
lawyer even if the lawyer could do nothing more than appear in
court, in part because they could not imagine what the lawyer could
or should be doing outside of court. Peters's book will make it eas
ier to insist upon maximum caseloads for children's lawyers so that
they can do what we should start expecting of them outside the
courtroom.
Although this book will be - and should be - of interest to
judges, agency attorneys, lawyers for parents, law professors (espe
cially clinical law teachers), and scholars, it is likely that the book's
primary audience will be lawyers who represent children. This seg
ment of the bar needs and deserves a clearly written text that tells
them what to do when representing children and why they ought to
do it. I expect that the book will have its greatest impact on what
lawyers actually do.

If that is right, it is important to begin with Peters's powerful
preference for insisting that lawyers take their instruction from
their "counseled client"49 and to try to assess what impact this pref
erence will have on lawyering. If Peters is successful in persuading
lawyers to follow her advice, lawyers in an overwhelming number
of cases will be advocating for results their clients want, even when
the lawyers are unsure such advocacy is well advised.
The question that naturally arises is: What are the preferences
of children in most cases? Regrettably, there is no empirical study
of which I am aware that reports the desires of children who are the
subject of child protective proceedings. Based on my experience in
twenty-five years of practice and my informal polling of lawyers in
these proceedings, I conclude that most children most of the time
want to stay with their families, or be returned as quickly as possi
ble to their families if they have been removed. If I am right, law
yers who follow Peters's advice will be doing what they can either
to reunite children with families from which they have been re49. Peters is one of many significant voices who advocate the necessity of empowering
children in the attorney-client relationship. But, as in all matters of lawyering, Peters is ex
tremely thoughtful and reasonable. She does not advocate that lawyers merely ask their
clients what they want and then expect lawyers to go out and try to accomplish that outcome.
Only after a client has been counseled, and the lawyer actively participates in a conversation
with the client about the range of available options and the pros and cons of each, would
Peters expect the lawyer to be ready to do the client's bidding. See id. at 1521, 1565.
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moved or to prevent removal in the first place. In my experience,
many lawyers for children are exceedingly uncomfortable doing
this. This discomfort may stem from a fear that a child will be
harmed as a result of the lawyer's successful advocacy. Or it may
derive from a belief that the child protective agency is an unworthy
adversary that has not protected the child adequately or made an
adequate case for separation. It may even come from a fear that
the media or an administrator in the office will blame or rebuke the
lawyer for taking a chance with the child's well-being.50
In my experience, many adults connected with child protective
cases treat children's expressed preferences quite differently, de
pending on what the child says. When children say they want to go
home, that wish is often received by adults the same way editors
treat a story about a dog biting a man - they aren't going to run
with it. On the other hand, when children say they do not want to
go home, adults frequently will invoke the child's preference as a
crucial factor to take into account. In this sense, children are em
powered in an odd rachet-like manner. When, but only when, they
do not want to go home, adults pay serious attention to their prefer
ences. Peters is trying to change this. She really wants lawyers to
take a child's preferences seriously, even when those preferences do
not jibe with the lawyer's sense of a good outcome.

B.

When Representing Children Too Young to Set the Objectives

Peters never quite provides definitive instructions to lawyers
representing very young children regarding exactly what they
should seek for their clients. I do not mean to criticize Peters for
this failure. One cannot do more than provide a general prescrip
tion of values and goals. Each case will necessarily contain its pecu
liar characteristics requiring the exercise of sound judgment by
well-meaning professionals.
Even more interestingly, Peters's book raises questions of how
much lawyers will continue to seek results based on the child's best
interests, rather than the child's preferences, even in those jurisdic
tions that expect lawyers to do so. Judges and legislators should
recognize that Peters's preference for empowering children may
50. Lost in this way of thinking is that all actions contain elements of risk and that chil
dren may be harmed to a far greater extent by removing them from their families than by
keeping them at home. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barna, Custodial Choices for
Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 139
(1995). Frequently, these points are lost because lawyers for children fail to obey one of
Peters's principles: Always make decisions from the client's perspective. Tue reason these
harms are not recognized, in other words, is that these harms do not directly impact the
lawyer. When children are harmed by removal, lawyers for children are never blamed.
When children are harmed by the failure to remove, the arguments made by the child's law
yer co=only are carefully scrutinized and blame frequently follows. It is understandable,
but lamentable, that these factors affect the professional role of a child's representative.
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well mean that lawyers following Peters's model will choose to per
mit their clients to set the objectives, even where statutes explicitly
instruct lawyers to adhere to a best interests standard. The deter
mined desire to empower children to direct their lawyers' choices
may lead lawyers (a) to advocate objectives of children who are
younger than courts would want to be so empowered and (b) to
ignore rules instructing lawyers to represent a child's best interests.
This second point may be troublesome to some.
The troublesome quality is that it may be impossible for a judge
ever to be sure whether the lawyer's arguments or recommenda
tions are actually the product of the lawyer's independent views or
merely reflect the preferences of the client. Even a direct order by
a judge to an attorney instructing the lawyer to disregard his or her
client's instructions regarding the objectives of the representation
may be problematic.51 Of course, the problem disappears when the
lawyer chooses to comply with the court's instructions. But the
question remains how and when judges can ever detect whether
lawyers who claim to be complying with their orders actually are
not doing so. There are, after all, some limits on a court's capacity
to interfere with the attorney-client relationship, even when the cli
ent is a young child.
In two ways, lawyers who are unsympathetic to a rule that binds
them to disregard their clients' instructions regarding the objectives
of the case may be able to thwart a court's attempt to oblige them
to advocate an outcome based on the lawyer's independent assess
ment of the case. First, it would appear lawyers would have a
rather easy time ignoring such an instruction and invoking the
attorney-client privilege when asked about the process by which
they chose to advocate the particular position they took in a case.
Alternatively, and shrewdly, lawyers may follow Peters's advice
about how to frame arguments on their client's behalf when appear
ing before judges who are disinclined to give great weight to the
child's preferences. Good lawyers will mask reliance on their cli
ent's preferences when arguing before courts known not to give
much weight to a child's preferences. As Peters advises children's
advocates, once lawyers know what results their clients want, it will
commonly be strategically sound for the lawyers to "translate" the
legal argument into the language of "best interests," so that judges
51. The key question becomes: When does an attorney-client relationship commence when an attorney says so, or when a court does? If it commences only when a court says so,
then arguably the court may attach any conditions it sees fit (regardless of the rules control
ling the conduct of lawyers) when it assigns a member of the bar to serve a purpose other
than as an attorney in an attorney-client relationship. If, however, an attorney-client rela
tionship commences whenever an attorney is representing a client, then the rules governing
attorney conduct - including the powerful one that attorneys must take their instruction
from their unimpaired clients - may trump a court order restricting the duties of counsel.
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will be more likely to decide the matter in accordance with the
child's wishes.52
III.

THEORETICAL ISSUES CONCERNING How TO DETERMINE
THE ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR YOUNG CHILDREN

Concealed in all discussions of the role of counsel for children
are two distinct concepts that I will simply call "process" and "sub
stance." By "process," I mean the formula by which the role of
counsel is to be determined. "Substance" refers to the actual role
of counsel for children in a particular setting. I have long been in
trigued about the process of representing children.53 Peters has
chosen in this book to emphasize the substance: what lawyers
ought to do when representing children in child protective
proceedings.
But Peters does more than tell lawyers what they should do
when representing children too young to determine the objectives
the lawyer should seek. She also justifies the reasons lawyers are to
do those things. In doing so, Peters has stepped precisely into my
specialized focus of studying how to determine the role of counsel.
And here, I believe, Peters has erred in her analysis. It is not that I
challenge Peters's goal to cabin the discretion lawyers exercise
when representing children. Nor do I question her advice about
what lawyers for children should actually be doing in child protec
tive proceedings - at least with regard to very young children.
Rather, I challenge the method by which she recommends that law
yers determine what they should advocate when representing very
young children in child protective proceedings.
I want to emphasize right away that this error has no bearing at
all on the substance of her argument, which is not merely correct
but wonderfully developed. Nonetheless, I want to try to demon
strate that Peters is wrong about why lawyers should represent very
young children in the manner she prescribes. One might wonder
why I would want to do this when I think so highly of her book.
The answer is precisely because I so strongly believe her book is
correct about what lawyers for young children should do that I want
to justify why they must do it in a way that is inarguable. I believe
that Peters's analysis opens the door to advocates who disagree
with her prescription, and who want to argue that lawyers for chil
dren should do the opposite from what Peters would require.
52. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1515.
53. See generally Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel
for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Repre
sented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv.
76 (1984).
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It is, of course, presumptive to call something "inarguable. " By
this term, I merely mean that what Peters has prescribed for law
yers representing children too young to set the case objectives
comes very close to being the corollary of the law as it is written in
every state. Thus, advocates who wish to argue that Peters is wrong
should be required to argue that the law of child protection is
wrong. I believe, and have developed the argument elsewhere,s4
that the role of counsel for young children in child protective cases
is to seek outcomes based on the substantive law defining children's
rights. Lawyers simply are not free to define for themselves what
children's lawyers should do. This is no less true when the lawyer
doing this defining is as perceptive as Peters.
In the long run, it is essential to obtain agreement on determin
ing the process by which the role of counsel is established. If I am
right, this requires little more than studying substantive law. Once
we know the controlling legal principles in any particular setting,
we will be able to identify what lawyers representing young children
should do.
As discussed earlier in this review, the need to develop an argu
ment of any kind for a particular role of counsel for very young
children stems from a shared understanding of the desirability that
lawyers for children not be free to impose their own values when
advocating an outcome.ss The goal, in the words of Robyn-Marie
Lyon, is to create a means by which lawyers are "guided by estab
lished procedures and explicit factors to determine the child's
position. "S6
What is Peters's method that I am questioning? Peters recom
mends that lawyers read for themselves various literature on child
development theory.57 She believes it is important that lawyers ed
ucate themselves by carefully reading theoretical and empirical
work by scholars in the child developmental field (p. 132). After
this critical reading, she recommends that a lawyer for children
"draw on the hard work of other disciplines and bring the best of
what those disciplines offer to his decision-making for his client" (p.
132).
***

54. See Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children,
Sllpra note 53.
55. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
56. Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role ofIndependent Colin·
selfor Minors, 75 CAL. L. REv. 681, 691 (1987). Ann Haralambie and Deborah Glaser agree
with this suggestion. See Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoreti·
cal Problems with the AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 57, 76-77 (1995).
57. See p. 132 (advising lawyers to read the important literature in nonlegal fields).
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Such an undertaking commonly means that lawyers will be ex
pected to choose between diametrically opposed theories or, if they
are as gifted a theorist as Peters is, to reconcile such theories (as
Peters attempts to do as discussed in Part II). Once lawyers have
made this choice, or have reconciled competing theories, the duties
imposed on counsel are supposed to follow accordingly. The crucial
question for purposes of reviewing Peters's book is: Who should be
encouraged to synthesize these sharply contrasting ideas about the
well-being of children? For Peters, the answer is lawyers assigned
the delicate task of representing the children whose lives are di
rectly impacted by judicial decisions.58 I do not agree.

An important goal in defining the role of counsel - indeed, as
Peters herself acknowledges, perhaps the most important objective
- is to restrict the discretion of randomly chosen members of the
bar. Peters is committed (as I am) to defining the role of counsel in
a way that ensures lawyers will perform like tasks and make like
arguments in similarly situated cases.59 But her very method of ar
gument is structured to fail in the long run to create a uniform role
for lawyers for young children. By arguing that lawyers should
adopt a particular way of thinking about childrearing and the needs
of children, and then use that way of thinking to guide them
through the myriad choices lawyers need to make to advance the
interests of their clients, Peters will succeed in creating uniformity
of role performance only for those lawyers who are persuaded by
her reasoning. Without realizing it, Peters has delivered a danger58. See p. 132. Peters is not the first writer to rely on her own views of what is good for
children when intending to influence how lawyers representing children should behave. In
deed, a good example of such is the effort of two other clinicians at Yale. Professors Stephen
W1Zner and Miriam Berkman, who train law students to represent young children in custody
proceedings, wrote an article in 1989 calculated both to explain how they decide what posi
tions to advocate and to encourage other lawyers to follow their ideas. See Stephen W1Zner
& Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study,
68 NEB. L. REv. 330 (1989). In the article, these authors delineate factors they recommend
lawyers use when representing young children in custody proceedings. Specifically, they pro
duce nine "presumptions" they recommend lawyers use when deciding what position to ad
vocate on behalf of children too young to set the objectives of the litigation. Among these
"presumptions" is their
principal presumption[ ] that children ought to be in the custody of that parent who has,
most consistently during the child's life, been the child's primary caregiver. Except in
the most extreme circumstances, involving the actual inability of the primary caregiver
to care for the child, a child should not be removed from the custody of the primary
caregiver.
Id. at 345. But their "presumptions" do not invariably comport with substantive law. Ac
cording to Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin, for example, California law "does not
embody any presumption in favor of primary caretakers, though in practice in disputed cases,
some weight is undoubtedly given to maintaining continuity in the caretaker role." ELEANOR
E. MAccoBY & ROBERT H. MNooKIN, DrvmING TiiE Cmm: SocIAL AND LEGAL DILEM
MAS OF CuSTODY 81 (1992); see alSo Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the
Limits of Law: On DIVIDING THE CHILD, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1808, 1809-10 (1994 (reviewing
DIVIDING TiiE CHILD, supra). But see Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986).
59. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1526.
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ous concealed message: lawyers are free to disagree with her the
ory about the needs of children and are even free to develop
theories for themselves. Once lawyers have developed the theories
they believe in, they may then implement them by representing
young children in a manner that advances these theories.
However persuasive her reasoning is (and I, for one, am quite
persuaded by it), it is unimaginable that all members of the Bar will
agree with her. Those who do not agree are no longer tethered by
any particular guiding principle that would restrain the choices they
need to make. Because Peters cannot hope to convince all practi
tioners of her theory, nonbelievers will use a different method of
representation based on their own theory of child development.
Encouraging lawyers to decide which social scientists to credit in
vites lawyers for young children to ignore the purposes and inten
tions of the substantive law and substitute it with their own
judgments. Theories of child development can be complicated, and
the creation of substantive laws about children's rights can be ex
traordinarily difficult. That is why, among other reasons, it is so
important that these judgments be made by judges and legislators
and not by randomly chosen members of the Bar acting as self
appointed private lawmakers. Thus, even in the short run, Peters
cannot possibly expect that everyone will follow her advice about
what is good for children.
Paradoxically, the greater Peters's contribution is in reconciling
substantively competing child development theories, the less we
should encourage individual members of the bar to choose one the
ory over the other. The more controversial the substantive ideas
that buttress the argument in favor of lawyers preferring a certain
outcome, the less these ideas should be permitted to form the basis
for deciding the role of counsel for young children. Ideally, the
principles underpinning a child advocate's position should enjoy the
support of most scholars and judges and legislators. When writers
such as Peters examine the literature and recommend particular
ideas as controlling principles for deciding cases about children,
they are making an important contribution. But it is misguided to
make this argument to the practicing bar. The proper role of young
children's lawyers should simply be to enforce their clients' rights.
Those rights derive from substantive law. For this reason, we
should be encouraging lawyers to study the substantive law that de
fines the rights of children and instructing lawyers to enforce those
rights assiduously.60
As I noted at the beginning of this Part, it turns out that the
recommendations Peters makes to lawyers about what presump60. See Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children,
supra note 53, at 1420-21.
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tions they should be making and what outcomes they should be
seeking are consistent with current law and policy. For example,
lawyers who carefully follow Peters's advice when representing chil
dren too young to set the objectives in their cases can be expected
to fight aggressively to avoid the trauma of removing children from
their families. Indeed, they will insist that removal be limited to
compelling reasons of safety.61 When removal is required to pro
tect a child from serious harm, the child's lawyer will insist that (a)
the child be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting
close to the child's community (ideally in a relative's home)62 and
(b) that regular, frequent visitation be provided for the child and his
or her parents and other important figures in the child's life.63
These lawyers will also pay careful attention to the development of
the case plan so that everyone has an early, clear idea of the obsta
cles to returning the child to his or her family.64 They will also
make certain that the parents be provided with assistance to help
them regain their children's custody promptly;65 and when children
have been living away from their parents for a significant period of
time, that serious consideration be given to formally recognizing the
now developed parent-child relationship that has resulted from the
out-of-home placement.66
But these principles will sound thoroughly familiar to readers
who know the substantive law of child protection and foster care
since 1980, when Congress passed the landmark Adoption Assist
ance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.67 Many state statutes have
codified the federal preference for keeping children with their fami
lies. The introductory purpose clauses of the statutes commonly
contain language similar to New York's, setting out the state's pur61. This is so because child developmentalists believe that children should not have their
primary parental relationship disrupted unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
62. See infra note 69.
63. See infra note 69.
64. See infra note 69.
65. See infra note 69.
66. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §103, 111 Stat. 2115,
2118-20.
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629e, 670-679a (1994). Under this Act, Congress mandated that
states receiving federal money must comply with specifications designed to prevent unneces
sary separation of children from their parents, to assure a careful monitoring of children who
are separated, and to provide an infusion of services into the family to speed the ultimate
return of children to their parents. Under current law, whenever a state removes a child
from the custody of his or her parent, the state must develop an individualized case plan, 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1994), which is required to provide for the child's placement "in the
least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available and in close proxim
ity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child," 42
U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (1994). To implement these principles and reduce the dangers to children
associated with a child's separation from loved ones, a foster care placement based upon
extended family relationships is preferable to a placement outside the family.
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poses in language quite consistent with Peters's view of what is best
for children.68
To the extent that Peters's views about what is best for children
reflects substantive law - and they do to a remarkable extent she is on the firmest possible ground for arguing what lawyers for
children should be trying to achieve on behalf of their young clients.
But lawyers should be acting for reasons radically different from
those proposed by Peters. The lawyers' role should not be justified
because current social science theory supports it or because a par
ticular scholar is persuaded of its correctness. Instead, their role is
to behave in a particular manner because the legislature or courts
have decided that these principles are correct. Though the lawyers'
role is not immutable, its changeability depends not on members of
the practicing bar changing their minds, nor on scholars changing
theirs, but on lawmakers changing theirs. That is how it should be.
CONCLUSION

Part of Peters's book is written to the wrong audience and says
the wrong things to the audience of practicing lawyers. When
Peters attempts to blend competing child developmental theories,
the audience she should be addressing is policymakers. This under
taking allows her to make an extremely valuable contribution to
our understanding of the needs of children. But other scholars
making similar contributions do not conceive of their work as being
directed to lawyers for children.69 Instead, the principal audience is
judges, legislators, policymakers, and other scholars who are writing
about what children need to thrive. But Peters's audience, at least
as I understand it, is primarily meant to be lawyers who will be
representing children. These lawyers ought not be encouraged to
become policymakers when representing children, or even to think
68. New York's statute declares that:
(i) it is desirable for children to grow up with a normal family life in a permanent home
and that such circumstance offers the best opportunity for children to develop and
thrive;
(ii) it is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the natural
parent because the child's need for a normal family life will usually best be met in
the natural home, and that parents are entitled to bring up their own children unless
the best interests of the child would be thereby endangered;
(iii) the state's first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up
or to reunite it if the child has already left home . . . .
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(a)(i)-(iii) (McKinney 1992).
69. The works of prominent theorists such as Joseph Goldstein and Peggy Davis, for ex
ample, are not aimed at how lawyers should act when representing children, but rather at the
principles upon which trial judges should decide cases, appellate judges should make law, or
legislators should enact law. Obviously, scholars such as Goldstein and Davis recognize that
their work ultimately will impact the things lawyers representing children should do. But
their goals are to influence the substantive rules by which cases are decided. Once that has
been accomplished, these scholars would expect lawyers representing children to conform
their behavior to the law.
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in terms of liberating themselves to answer weighty questions such
as what substantive rules best serve their client's needs.

All law about child custody, including even child protection,
must be grounded in theory. This theory is not immutable - far
from it. When the law changes in accordance with these theories,
there is a full and fair opportunity to challenge the theories and
amend them over time. But when we allow - and even encourage
- private members of the bar to advocate on behalf of a young
child in accordance with a child developmental theory that has not
been incorporated into law, two serious problems arise. First, child
advocates will be free to disagree about which theory to endorse.
This will create chaos in differential representation. Second, child
advocates will in effect have become private lawmakers. This may
not appear to be much of a problem at first glance. Advancing the
law in a progressive direction is a good to be supported. But let's
look at this phenomenon slightly differently. Instead of calling this
"advancing" the law, we might more accurately call it undermining
the law (much as a civil disobedient does).
Children's advocates who want the substantive law to change
should not try to persuade lawyers of such a need. Even if success
ful in the short run, their contribution to the subject of what lawyers
should do will not survive the next wave of social science theory,
unless their arguments move from the relatively obscure world of
principles on which lawyers for children ought to operate, to the
highly visible one of principles on which judges are to decide cases.
In other words, Peters should be telling lawyers not what good the
ory is, but what good practice is. Good practice for lawyers is not to
take the law into their own hands, nor to figure out for themselves
which competing child developmental theory is correct. It should
be only to determine what the law says is a child's right.
None of this is to say that the readers of Peters's book should
refrain from following carefully Peters's brilliant advice about how
to be strategic advocates for their clients. I, for one, would be ex
tremely pleased if lawyers representing children became faithful ad
herents to Peters's prescriptions for practice. My disagreement is
solely over how Peters comes to her conclusions. I only hope law
yers pay more attention to what Peters says about what they should
be doing on behalf of their clients and less attention to the reason
ing that leads Peters to her conclusions.

